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EXDIS

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM JIDDA DATED JULY 19, 1978 SENT
SECSTATE WASHDC INFO ANKARA, ISLAMABAD, KABUL, LONDON,
MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, PARIS, TEHRAN IS REPEATED TO YOU:
QUOTE

S E C R E T JIDDA 5327

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AF, SA, IN, PA, IR, US

SUBJ: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S MEETING WITH FONMIN SAUD -
DISCUSSION OF SOUTH ASIAN TRIP

SUMMARY: UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM DISCUSSED SOUTH ASIA,
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HORN OF AFRICA, YEMENS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND LEBANON IN
ALMOST THREE HOUR MEETING WITH FONMIN SAUD. HE REVIEWED
HIS TALKS WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN TEHRAN, DELHI, KABUL
AND ISLAMABAD, DESCRIBING CURRENT USG POLICY IN EACH
COUNTRY. ALL COUNTRIES IN REGION BELIEVE U.S. SHOULD
CONTINUE PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND AVOID PROVOCATIVE
ACTIONS. PAKISTAN REPROCESSING ISSUE STILL UNRESOLVED
BUT ZIA NOW HAS FULLER APPRECIATION OF WHAT USG
CAN DO ONCE THIS HURDLE SURMOUNTED. SAUDI ARABIA WILL
CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. SAG VIEWS NEW

AFGHAN REGIME AS COMMUNIST AND FEARS IT WILL STIR UP
BORDER PROBLEMS WITH NEIGHBORS. END SUMMARY.

1. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM MET FOR TWO HOURS AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES JULY 18 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER THUNAYYAN, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MANSURI, AND DEPUTY MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS ALIREZA. AMBASSADOR WEST, EMBOFFS AND DEPTOFF ALSO PRESENT. DISCUSSION COVERED NEWSOM TRIP TO SOUTH ASIA, YEMENS, HORN OF AFRICA, LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. SEPTELS BEING SENT ON EACH SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES.

2. NEWSOM OPENED MEETING BY EXPLAINING THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD ASKED HIM TO MAKE TRIP TO AREA TO LISTEN TO CONCERNS OF STATES IN REGION AND TO RECOMMEND WHAT ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS U.S. MIGHT UNDERTAKE IN AREA. HE ASSURED SAUD THAT U.S. CONTINUES TO TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN INFLUENCE IN REGION. NEWSOM NOTED THAT SOVIET UNION REMAINS PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY OF U.S. AND THAT OUR LARGE DEFENSE BUDGET, STATIONING OF TROOPS IN EUROPE AND NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN ILLUSTRATE OUR DETERMINATION TO MEET THE SOVIET THREAT
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TO OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. SAUDI ARABIA AND SURROUNDING AREA IS OF IMPORTANCE TO U.S. FOR HISTORICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC REASONS, AND WE FULLY APPRECIATE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF SAG OVER INCREASES IN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN REGION.

3. NEWSOM EXPLAINED COMPLEXITY OF SOMETIMES CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES WHICH USG MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING ITS FOREIGN POLICIES, INCLUDING SUCH FACTORS AS STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, NON-PROLIFERATION, CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES LIMITATIONS, PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA WHICH COULD OFFER SOVIETS OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT, BALANCE OF TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. NEWSOM SAID HE BELIEVES USG HAS WELL DEMONSTRATED ITS INTEREST IN THIS REGION BY EFFORTS TO SELL AIRCRAFT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT, MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR SUDAN, KENYA AND JORDAN AND OUR DESIRE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO SAUDI CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN.

4. NEWSOM REVIEWED IMPRESSIONS HE GAINED FROM HIS TALKS IN SOUTH ASIAN CAPITALS. IN IRAN HE FOUND SHAH AS CONCERNED AS SAG AND USG BY INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA. HE HAD URGED SHAH TO ASSIST IN HELPING PAKISTAN IN CONCERT WITH SAUDI ARABIA, FRANCE AND U.S. IRAN HAS HELD UP ON \$300 MILLION LOAN GUARANTEE BUT NEWSOM HDIMPRESS ON SHAH S WILLING TO ASSIST GOP (INCLUDING FINANCING PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT OR TRANSFER OF IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WHEN REPLACEMENTS AVAILABLE)

ONCE REPROCESSING ISSUE HURDLED. SHAH WOULD ALSO HOLD OFF UNTIL IT CLEAR BHUTTO WILL NOT BE EXECUTED, STEP WHICH SHAH BELIEVES WOULD ONLY WORSEN ALREADY UNSTABLE PAK POLITICAL SITUATION. SHAH VIEWS AFGHAN SITUATION PESSIMISTICALLY BUT BELIEVES WEST MUST MAINTAIN A PRESENCE AND NOT TAKE PROVOCATIVE ACTS WHICH ONLY RISK WORSENING SITUATION.

5. INDIANS TAKE MORE RELAXED VIEW OF AFGHANISTAN, ALTHOUGH
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THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL. DELHI DOES NOT WELCOME POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED INSTABILITY ALONG AFGHAN-PAK BORDER. INDIANS ARE FRUSTRATED BY THEIR INABILITY TO OVERCOME DEEP-SEATED PAKISTANI HOSTILITY AND DISTRUST TOWARD INDIA. THEY SEEM SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN BUT THEY DON'T APPRECIATE HOW DEEP PAKISTANI FEELINGS AGAINST INDIA RUN AND HOW MUCH KASHMIR IS THORN IN GOP'S FLESH.

6. CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN, NEWSOM SAID THE NEW REGIME, WHICH HAS BROADER SUPPORT THAN WAS EVER SUSPECTED BEFORE COUP, IS COMMUNIST IN CHARACTER BUT NOT YET FORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HE FOUND RECEPTIVENESS TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND TO CONTINUED U.S. AID PROGRAMS. NEWSOM PUT GOA ON NOTICE THAT THREE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE JUDGED IN ORDER FOR AFGHANISTAN TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE U.S. ASSISTANCE;

(A) DEGREE TO WHICH RULING PARTY MANIFESTS CONNECTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT; (B) DEGREE TO WHICH DRA CREATES PROBLEMS FOR PAKISTAN AND IRAN; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH U.S. AID PERSONNEL HAVE SAME ACCESS AS OTHERS.

7. IN PAKISTAN, AS SAG KNOWS, NEWSOM SAID U.S. HAS SERIOUS PROBLEM OVER REPROCESSING PLANT WHICH HAS FORCED US TO HOLD UP ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT PROGRAMS. HE SOUGHT TO PERSUADE GENERAL ZIA TO REORDER PRIORITIES, IN LIGHT OF CHANGED AFGHAN CIRCUMSTANCES, TO ENABLE PAKISTAN POLITICALLY TO SET ASIDE REPROCESSING PLANT AND TO GET ON WITH PREVIOUS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, PAKISTANIS FEEL PLANT IS NATIONAL SYMBOL, THAT U.S. IS DISCRIMINATING AGAINST PAKISTAN IN FAVOR OF INDIA, AND THAT IF
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U.S. CANNOT PROVIDE HELP THEN PAKISTAN MUST EXAMINE OPTIONS SUCH AS LEAVING CENTO IN ORDER TO REDUCE PRESSURES FROM SOVIETS. WHILE HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT DECISION GOP WOULD MAKE ON REPROCESSING PLANT, NEWSOM EXPLAINED HE

HAD OUTLINED TO ZIA THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH U.S. COULD MAKE AVAILABLE ONCE PRESENT BARRIER SURMOUNTED; AND HE NOTED THAT INDIANS HAD UNDERSTOOD POSSIBILITY OF SUCH U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. ZIA HAD SAID THAT INCREASED ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND U.S. REAFFIRMATION OF DURAND LINE WOULD GO LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING HIS CONCERNS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SAUD CONFIRMED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD JOIN IN EFFORTS TO MEET PAKISTANI MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

8. SAUD SAID SAG WELCOMED NEWSOM'S VISIT TO AREA AS COMING AT OPPORTUNE MOMENT WHEN CONCERN HIGH OVER SOVIET INROADS IN REGION. WHILE U.S. VIEWS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IN BROAD AND SOPHISTICATED TERMS, COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN AND IRAN VIEW SOVIET THREAT IN VERY DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE TERMS BECAUSE OF THEIR PROXIMITY TO SOVIET UNION.

9. NEWSOM SAID U.S. STILL BELIEVES CENTO SERVES USEFUL PURPOSE IN REGION DESPITE SKEPTICAL ATTITUDES OF TURKEY, IRAN AND PAKISTAN TOWARD ORGANIZATION. SAUD COMMENTED THAT TURKS AND PAKS VIEW CENTO AS MEANINGLESS ALLIANCE UNLESS IT CAN MEET DIRECT AND INDIRECT THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY. PAKS SEE CENTO AS USELESS AGAINST STATES ACTING AS SOVIET SURROGATES (E.G. AFGHANISTAN AND, PERHAPS, INDIA). SOVIETS OPENLY TELL ALL THREE COUNTRIES THAT THEY REGARD CENTO AS AN ANTI-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND THAT THEY MUST LEAVE CENTO IF THEY WISH TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

10. SAUD SAID THAT, IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S REQUEST, SAG RAISED REPROCESSING PLANT WITH GOP. HE NOTED HIGHLY SECRET

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POLITICAL NATURE OF DECISION TO SUSPEND OR CANCEL PLANT AND SAID IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR GOP WHEN THEY UNCERTAIN WHAT ASSISTANCE THEY WILL GET FROM U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN GOP FEELS THERE HAS BEEN DRASTIC CHANGE AND THAT THEY HAVE LOST THEIR BUFFER. SINCE THE AFGHAN COUP THEY HAVE INCREASED THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH FRIENDLY MUSLIM STATES AND WOULD LIKE TO GET MORE U.S. ASSISTANCE. SAG HAS ASSURED PAKISTAN IT WILL CONTINUE GOOD RELATIONS AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.

11. SAG VIEWS AFGHANISTAN AS COMMUNIST. LANGUAGE OF THE NEW LEADERS, THEIR ORGANIZATION AND THEIR SOVIET SUPPORT AT ALL LEVELS BESPEAK THIS. SO DOES INCREASE IN NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW AND PRESENCE OF MANY NEW SOVIET ADVISORS, INCLUDING TRIBESMEN FROM SOUTHERN RUSSIA WHO BLEND INTO LOCAL POPULATION. DRA HAS DONE NOTHING TO CALM FEARS OF NEIGHBORING PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THEY SAY THEY ARE REVIEWING FILES AND WILL DISCUSS BORDER PROBLEMS

LATER. SAG BELIEVES THIS INDICATES DRA HAS SOVIET BACK-
ING TO DISPUTE BORDER ISSUES; OTHERWISE, DRA WOULD BE
AFRAID TO RAISE CONCERN AMONG NEIGHBORS AT TIME WHEN ITS
FIRST PRIORITY IS CONSOLIDATING ITS INTERNAL POSITION.
IRAN VIEWS DRA AS COMMUNIST AND A DESTABILIZING FACTOR
IN REGION BUT WILL CONTINUE RELATIONS TO PREVENT AFGHAN-
ISTAN FROM FALLING COMPLETELY UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION.
IRAN HAS SUGGESTED INDIAN-IRANIAN-PAKISTANI COOPERATION
BUT INDIANS (SIC) HAVE OPPOSED THIS SUGGESTION. SAUDP
ADDED THAT BAGHDAD ALSO IS DISTURBED AND SEES AFGHAN
COUP AS SOVIET ADVANCE IN REGION. SAUD CONCLUDED BY
REPEATING STANDARD SAG VIEW THAT SOVIETS ENGAGED IN
CLEAR, STEP-BY-STEP STRATEGY TO SURROUND AND EVENTUALLY
CONTROL IRAN AND GULF STATES. MOSCOW IS NO
LONGER SATISFIED WITH 80 PERCENT CONTROL IN KABUL OR ADEN BUT
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NOW WANTS COMPLETE CONTROL, WHICH IT HAS ACHIEVED THROUGH
RECENT COUPS. NONE OF COUNTRIES IN REGION CAN FACE UP
TO SOVIET CHALLENGE WITHOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE.

12. NEWSOM COMMENTED IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT ALL COUNTRIES
IN REGION WANT U.S. TO MAINTAIN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN
AND ALL AGREE NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO TAKE ANY PROVOCATIVE
ACTION AGAINST NEW REGIME. NEW REGIME HAS INTERNAL PROB-
LEMS AND BY MAINTAINING PRESENCE WE MAY HAVE SOME LEVER-
AGE TO KEEP GOA NON-ALIGNED AS WELL AS BEING PRESENT TO
TAKE BETTER ADVANTAGE OF ANY INTERNAL LICIAL CHANGES
WHICH MAY OCCUR.

13. SUMARIZING REVIEW OF HIS IMPRESSIONS OF SOUTH ASIA,
NEWSOM SAID FIRST PRIORITY TO U.S. IS TO FIND MEANS TO
STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN IF WE ARE TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER
SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA. OUR SECOND
PRIORITY IS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIP-
MENT OF IMPORTANCE TO IRAN. TO THIS END USG WILL SOON
BEGIN CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON MAJOR ITEMS OF
EQUIPMENT WHICH IRAN WANTS TO PURCHASE AND WILL SEND A
TEAM TO DISCUSS DETAILS WITH GOI NEXT MONTH. OUR THIRD
PRIORITY IS TO MAINTAIN CLOSES POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH
SAUDI ARABIA AND TO DISCUSS WITH SAG SPECIFIC ACTIONS
WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CAN TAKE TO MEET GROWING REGIONAL
CONCERNS.
WEST UNQUOTE VANCE

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